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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Jeremy Brown appeals from the district court’s order denying his Rule 35 motion for 
additional credit for time served. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
While incarcerated in 2009, Brown committed the crime of aggravated battery on another 
inmate.  (38147 R., pp.16-17; R., p.34.)  On May 25, 2010, pursuant to Brown’s guilty plea, the 
district court entered judgment against Brown for aggravated battery and sentenced him to six 
years with two years fixed.  (38147 R., pp.34-35.)  Brown did not appeal from his judgment.  
Instead, Brown filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence (id., pp.60-64), which the 
district court denied (id., p.105).  Brown timely appealed the denial of his Rule 35 motion.  (Id., 
pp.107-09.)  In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court.  State v. 
Brown, Docket No. 38147, 2011 Unpublished Op. No. 489 (Idaho App., May 23, 2011). 
Several years later, in December 2015, Brown filed motions requesting additional credit 
for time served.  (R., pp.7-10, 14.)  Brown had previously been given 55 days credit for time 
served.  (R., pp.9, 55.)  The parties initially stipulated that Brown was entitled to a total of 99 
days credit for time served.  (R., p.27.)  However, after reviewing the record in the underlying 
criminal case, the district court expressed its concerns that Brown’s motion may not have been 
well taken and asked the parties to address its prior orders on the issue.  (R., pp.34-35.)  
Following a hearing on the motions (R., p.54), the district court entered an order denying 
Brown’s motion for additional credit for time served and correcting Brown’s prior sentence by 
withdrawing the 55 days credit for time served previously granted.  (R., pp.55-60.)  Brown filed 
a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.62-63.) 
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ISSUE 
Brown states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Brown’s motion for credit for time 
served? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.3.) 
 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Brown’s judgment became final in 2010.  Has Brown failed to show that the district court 
erred under the legal standards applicable to his 2010 judgment when it denied his Rule 35 
motion for additional credit for time served? 
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ARGUMENT 
Brown Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred Under The Legal Standards 
Applicable To His 2010 Judgment When It Denied His Rule 35 Motion For Additional Credit 
For Time Served 
 
A. Introduction 
In his underlying criminal case, Brown was granted 55 days credit for time served.  (R., 
pp.9, 55.)  Below, Brown filed motions requesting an additional 44 days credit for time served 
for a total of 99 days credit for time served.  (R., pp.7-10, 14, 27.)  The district court denied 
Brown’s motion for additional credit for time served and, after reviewing the file and finding the 
initial grant of 55 days to have been erroneous, also corrected Brown’s sentence by withdrawing 
the 55 days credit for time served.  (R., pp.55-60.)   
Now on appeal, Brown argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for 
additional credit for time served and asserts that he is entitled to 190 days credit for time served.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  Application of the legal standards applicable to Brown’s 2010 
judgment, however, shows no error by the district court in denying Brown’s request. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
“The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit for time served 
to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is subject to free review by the 
appellate courts.”  State v. Leary, 160 Idaho 349, 352, 372 P.2d 404, 407 (2016) (quotation and 
citations omitted). 
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C. Under The Legal Standards Applicable To His 2010 Judgment, Brown Was Not Entitled 
To Credit For Time Served  
 
Under Idaho Code § 18-309, a defendant is entitled to credit for time served in relation to 
the conviction on which he is sentenced.  Recently, in State v. Brand, 162 Idaho 189, ___, 
395 P.3d 809, 812 (2017), the Idaho Supreme Court interpreted this statute as allowing credit 
even for periods of presentence incarceration that were “both initiated and maintained due to a 
prior, unrelated offense.”  The Court also set forth various “scenarios to provide guidance as to 
how credit is to be determined.”  Id. at ___, 395 P.3d at 813.  Brown relies almost exclusively on 
the Brand holding for his argument that he is entitled to additional credit for time served and, 
focusing on the first scenario, asserts that it is controlling.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp.4-5.)  The 
state agrees that, were the Brand holding applicable to this case, it would be determinative.  
However, because the Court’s holding in Brand is not retroactive, it is not applicable, and 
Brown’s reliance is misplaced. 
In the specific context of Rule 35 motions for credit for time served, the Idaho Supreme 
Court noted that it “explicitly adopted the retroactivity test from Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 
(1989), for criminal cases on collateral review.”  State v. Owens, 158 Idaho 1, 6, 343 P.3d 30, 35 
(2015) (citing Rhoades v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 133, 233 P.3d 61, 64 (2010); Fields v. State, 
149 Idaho 399, 401, 234 P.3d 723, 735 (2010)).  Generally, new interpretations of criminal 
procedural rules do not apply retroactively to cases already final when the new rule is 
announced.  Id. (citations omitted).  There are two exceptions to this general rule: “(1) the rule 
substantively alters punishable conduct or (2) the rule is a ‘watershed’ rule implicating the 
fundamental fairness of the trial.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Neither exception applies to this case. 
The first step in a retroactivity analysis is to determine whether the case announces a new 
rule, meaning that “the result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s 
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conviction became final.”  Id. (emphasis original) (citing State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 505 
(Wyo. 2014); Teague, 489 U.S. at 301).  Before Brand, the Supreme Court had never interpreted 
Idaho Code § 18-309 as requiring credit for periods of presentence incarceration initiated and 
maintained due to an unrelated offense.  Thus, the result in Brand was not dictated by existing 
precedent and the case announced a new rule. 
The second step is to determine whether the new rule meets either the substantive rule 
exception or the watershed rule exception to retroactivity.  Id.  “A rule is substantive when it 
alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes.”  Id. (citing Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004)).  A rule is a watershed rule when it improves accuracy 
and alters an understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to a proceeding’s 
fairness.  Id. (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).  As in Owens, the Court’s new 
interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-309 “does not alter the class of persons or the conduct the law 
punishes”; rather, it “only alters the amount of time a person spends incarcerated after the court 
determines he committed punishable conduct.”  Id.  The Brand rule is therefore procedural, not 
substantive.  Moreover, as in Owens, the Brand holding only affects punishment after trial, not a 
trial’s fundamental fairness, and is therefore not a watershed rule.  Id. 
Because the Brand holding does not meet the test for retroactivity, as in Owens, the 
Court’s new interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-309 can only apply prospectively and to cases 
now on direct review.  See Id. at 7, 343 P.3d at 36.  Brown’s case is not a direct appeal of his 
judgment; it is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion for credit for time served, which is 
a collateral attack on his underlying judgment.  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th Ed. 2014) 
(defining “collateral attack” as “[a]n attack on a judgment in a proceeding other than a direct 
appeal”).  Because Brown’s Rule 35 motion was a collateral attack on the judgment, and not a 
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direct review of that judgment, the Court’s new interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-309 does not 
apply to his motion. 
Because the holding of Brand cannot be given retroactive effect, Brown’s Rule 35 motion 
challenging the legality of his sentence was limited to the law existing at the time the judgment 
became final.  Judgment becomes final either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance 
of the judgment on appeal.  See State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003).  
Brown did not timely appeal from his judgment, but only appealed from the denial of his initial 
Rule 35 motion.  (See 38147 R., pp.107-09.)  Brown’s judgment thus became final once the time 
to appeal had expired, on July 6, 2010.  Even had Brown’s appeal from the denial of his Rule 35 
motion also been timely from the judgment, his case would still have become final on June 15, 
2011, when the Court of Appeals issued its remittitur.  Peregrina v. State, 158 Idaho 948, 951, 
354 P.3d 510, 513 (Ct. App. 2015) (where timely appeal is filed, judgment becomes final when 
the appellate court issues remittitur).  Whether in 2010 or 2011, under the precedents then 
applicable to the determination of credit for time served, Brown was not entitled to any credit for 
time served that was due to prior unrelated offenses.  See State v. Beer, 97 Idaho 684, 551 P.2d 
971 (1976); State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67, 68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. 
Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850-51, 865 P.2d 176, 177-78 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Dorr, 120 Idaho 
441, 443, 816 P.2d 998, 1000 (Ct. App. 1991).   
The district court properly credited Brown with all of the time to which he was entitled at 
the time judgement became final, and Brown has failed to show that the holding of Brand can be 
applied retroactively to challenge his final judgment.  Under the precedents applicable to his case 
when it became final, the district court did not err in its calculation of credit for time served.  The 
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district court’s order denying Brown’s Rule 35 motion for additional credit for time served 
should be affirmed. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s order denying 
Brown’s Rule 35 motion for additional credit for time served. 
 DATED this 13th day of September, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Russell J. Spencer____________ 
      RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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